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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In the principal case7 the same reasoning was followed as the rei~ocation
provision was said to "carry with it the thought that whatever is done
to effect a revocation must be done in the lifetime of the settlor." The
court found no language authorizing the revocation of the trust agree-
ment by will, or from which an inference to that effect could be drawn.
Conversely, where the settlor reserves a power to revoke only by
will, an attempted revocation during his lifetime is ineffective as it is
not in accord with the mode specified by the reserved power of
revocation.8
A third situation exists where a power of revocation is reserved
without specifying the manner in which it is to be exercised. An ex-
ample of this type of reserved power in its simplest form is "this trust
shall be revocable." It seems that this would allow the settlor to exer-
cise his reserved power in any manner which clearly evidences his
intention to revoke.9
In the cases where a settlor attempts to revoke an inter vivos trust
by his will, or by an act during his life, and fails because he has not
reserved the power to revoke in the manner attempted, his latest inten-
tion has been thwarted. The remedy, however, was within the grasp of
the original draftsman. The settlor should be instructed as to his right
to reserve a power to revoke by an inter vivos transaction or by his
will. If the settlor is uncertain at the time as to which mode he will
in the future prefer to exercise, the draftsman, by clear and concise
language, should include both modes in the reserved power of revo-
cation. This would leave no possibility of ambiguity. By the use of
this method the settlor's intent as to the mode of future revocations
could be effectuated, and the courts would be spared the troublesome
problem of interpreting such agreements.
J. C. JOHNSON, JR.
Wills-Pretermission Statute-Sufficiency of Life Insurance
As Provision for After-Born Child
Under the North Carolina pretermission statute,1 children born after
I Cohn v. Central Nat. Bank of Richmond, 191 Va. 12, 60 S. E. 2d 30 (1950).
'Underhill v. U. S. Trust Co., 227 Ky. 44, 13 S. W. 2d 502 (1929); Dickey
v. Goldsmith, 60 Misc. 258, 111 N. Y. Supp. 1025 (1908).
' Security Trust Co. v. Spruance, 20 Del. Ch. 195, 174 AtI. 285 (1934) ; Hoffa
v. Hough, 181 Md. 472, 30 A. 2d 761 (1943); Lambdin v. Dantzebecker, 169 Md.
240, 181 AtI. 353 (1935) ; Barnard v. Gantz, 140 N. Y. 249, 35 N. E. 430 (1893).
But cf. Mayer v. Tucker, 102 N. J. Eq. 524, 141 Atl. 799 (1928); Stone v.
Hackett, 12 Gray 227 (Mass. 1858).
1 N. C. GEN. STAT. §31-45 (1943): "Children born after the making of the
parent's will, and whose parent shall die without making any provision for them,
shall be entitled to such share and portion of the parent's estate as if he or she
had died intestate, and the rights of any such after-born child shall be a lien
on every part of the parent's estate, until his several share thereof is set apart in
the manner prescribed in §28-153 to 28-158."
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
the making of the parent's will, for whom no provision is made, are
entitled to share in the testator's estate as if he had died intestate.
Recently in Williamson v. Williamson2 the question was raised as to
whether the procurement of a life insurance policy, naming as benefi-
ciary a child born after the execution of the parent's will, constituted
the making of "any provision" for such child within the meaning of
the statute.
Under the facts of this case, the testator had one child living at the
time he executed a will devising his entire estate to his wife, but sub-
sequently another child was born to the testator. Neither child was
mentioned nor provided for in the will. Later, however, the testator
procured a double indemnity life insurance policy under which the two
children were named as beneficiaries and each received $4,000 at his
death. The court, interpreting the statute, held that the benefits of the
policy did not constitute a provision for the after-born child. Had the
case not been decided on other grounds, the court would have reached
the absurd result of permitting the after-born to receive an intestate
share in the parent's estate to the exclusion of the other child.
In the instant case, the court based its decision on the earlier case
of Sorrell v. Sorrells stating that the facts of both were on "all fours."
Yet, upon examination the two cases seem to be distinguishable. In
the principal case, the testator had a natural child living at the execution
of his will, while in the Sorrell case the testator had no children at
the time the will was executed, but later adopted one child prior to the
birth of another. Thus in the latter case, the facts strongly support
the contention that the testator did not entertain any idea whatsoever of
children at the time he executed his will. In the Williamson case, how-
ever, it is arguable that since the testator was cognizant of his living
child upon execution of the will, his intention was to exclude or dis-
inherit all his children as a class.4 Some jurisdictions, when presented
a fact situation similar to the instant case, have reached this result in
construing their pretermisison statutes.5 Still, it must be noted that in
2 232 N. C. 54, 59 S. E. 2d 214 (1950).
8 193 N. C. 439, 137 S. E. 306 (1927).
'Leonard v. Enochs, 17 S. W. 437, 438 (Ky. 1891) (". . . it would be an
anomaly to hold that all the testator's living children-infants and all-were in-
tentionally excluded as a class in the interest of the testator's wife, and the child
thereafter born, by reason of the accidental time of its birth, was not intentionally
omitted").
'ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 39, §10 (1935): "If, after making a last will and testa-
ment, a child shall be born to any testator, and no provision be made in such
will for such child, the will shall not on that account be revoked; but unless it
shall appear by such will that it was the intention of the testator to disinherit
such child, the devises and legacies by such will granted and given, shall be
abated in equal proportions to raise a portion for such child equal to that which
such child would have been entitled to receive out of the estate of such testator
if he had died intestate .... " Froelich v. Minwegen, 304 Ill. 462, 136 N. E. 669
1951]
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jurisdictions so holding, the pertinent statutes are more susceptible to
such interpretation than is the North Carolina statute.6
Even if it be conceded that the two cases are not distinguishable
and the statutes of other jurisdictions more clearly permit the disinheri-
tance theory, why has the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the
benefits of an insurance policy are not an adequate provision for after-
born children? In the principal case, the court speaks of the inherent
unsuitability of life insurance as a provision because of its indirectness
as ex parentis peovisione since it is not of reasonable substance and
(1922) (testator had 2 children living at the time he made his will leaving
everything to his wife, and thereafter 6 other children were born; court held
that testator manifested his intention to disinherit after-born children) ; Peet v.
Peet, 229 III. 341, 82 N. E. 376 (1907) (testator had a son living at time will was
executed leaving estate to his wife and another son was born thereafter; the
court found that will disclosed an intention that neither should take any interest
in the estate but that both should be cared for by their mother); Hawhe v.
Chicago & W. I. Ry., 165 Il. 561, 46 N. E. 240 (1897) (testator had 2 children
living at execution of will and another child born subsequently; court held fact
that testator had 2 children at time of making will to whom he made no allusion
was sufficient to show an intention to disinherit not only living children, but also
after-born children).
Ky. REv. STAT. §394.380(2) (1948) : "If a will is made when a testator has a
child living, and a child is born afterward, such after-born child, or any descendant
of his, if not provided for by any settlement, and neither provided for nor expressly
excluded by the will, but only pretermitted, shall succeed to the portion of the
testator's estate that he would have been entitled to if the testator had died
intestate . . . ," Leonard v. Enochs, 92 Ky. 186, 17 S. W. 437 (1891) (where
testator had a child living at the time will was executed leaving his estate to
his wife and another child was born 2 months after his death, court found that
since the living child was excluded by intentional omission, it was evident that
the exclusion was not intended to apply to the particular living child, but to all
testator's children as a class).
TENN. CODE ANN. §8131 (Williams 1934): "A child born after the making of
a will, either before or after the death of the testator, inclusive of a mother
testatrix, not provided for nor disinherited, but only pretermitted, in such will,
.and not provided for by settlement made by the testator in his lifetime, shall
succeed to the same portion of the testator's estate as if he had died intestate."
Fleming v. Phoenix Trust Co., 162 Tenn. 511, 39 S. W. 2d 277 (1931) (testator
had 2 children living at time of execution of will leaving everything to his wife,
and another child was born shortly thereafter; court held that statute not applicable
as it clearly appeared from will that testator intended to confer his estate upon
his wife and omitted all his children as a class, not merely the living ones);
Reeves v. Hager, 101 Tenn. 712, 50 S. W. 760 (1899) (testatrix had child living
at time will was made leaving everything to husband, and another child was
born subsequently; court found that testatrix, by failing to mention the two chil-
dren, disinherited them in favor of their father).
Wis. STAT. §238.10 (1949) : "Where any child shall be born after the making
of his parent's will and no provision shall be made therein for him, such child
shall have the same share in the estate of the testator as if he had died intestate;
and the share of such child shall be assigned to him as provided by law in case
of intestate estates unless it shall be apparent from the will that it was the
intention of the testator that no provision should be made for such child." In re
Read's Will, 180 Wis. 497, 193 N. W. 382 (1923) (where testator had 5 children
living at time he made will leaving entire estate to wife and child born after
that date, court found testator manifested an intention to exclude all children from
sharing in the estate since it would be unreasonable that he would be more
solicitous for after-born children than for those he knew at the making of will).
' See notes 1 and 5 supra.
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value in presenti but only a possibility which must be fed to be kept
alive. This precise point has been raised in the New York court. That
court has held that although the possibility of the after-born child re-
ceiving the benefit of a provision is wholly contingent, it is still a suffi-
cient provision to prevent the operation of the pretermission statute.7
In construing a statute8 very similar to the North Carolina statute, the
New York Court of Appeals reasoned that since a testator may meet
the possibility of after-born children by mere mention or a very general
provision in the will, as is also the law in North Carolina,9 "it would
be somewhat idle, if not inconsistent, to hold that in order to be effective
as a 'provision' a bequest or devise must be vested, certain and ade-
quate."' 0  Accordingly, that jurisdiction has liberally interpreted its
statute so as not to efeat the intention of the testator and has held
that an after-born child, not mentioned in the will, is provided for
within the meaning of the statute by life insurance,1 trust, 12 and Totten
trust.'
3
Both the language in early North Carolina cases declaring the pur-
pose of the statute, and a "plain-meaning" interpretation thereof, lead
to the conclusion that the court could well have reached the New York
view in the principal case. The court has stated that the statute was
not designed to control a parent as to the provision he should make,
and that it was only intended to apply when the omission to provide for
7 In re Kirk's Estate, 191 Misc. Rep. 473, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 378 (1948) ; In re
Kreutz' Will, 49 N. Y. S. 2d 402 (1944); In re Hagendorn's Will, 41 N. Y. S.
2d 491 (1943) ; In re Jones' Will, 134 Misc. Rep. 26, 234 N. Y. Supp. 316 (1929) ;
McLean v. McLean, 207 N. Y. 365, 101 N. E. 178 (1913). Contra: Minot v.
Minot, 17 App. Div. 521, 45 N. Y. Supp. 554 (1897).8 N . Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW §26: "Whenever a testator shall have a child
born after the making of a last will, either in the lifetime or after the death of
such testator, and shall die leaving such child, so after-born, unprovided for by
any settlement, and neither provided for, nor in any way mentioned in such will,
every such child shall succeed to the same portion of such parent's real and per-
sonal estate, as would have descended or been distributed to such child, if such
parent had died intestate, and shall be entitled to recover; the same portion from
the devisees and legatees, in proportion to and out of the parts devised and be-
queathed to them by such will." In re Bryant's Estate, 121 Misc. Rep. 102, 201
N. Y. Supp. 60 (1923) (court construed the word "settlement" as meaning "to
provide for" or "to make provision for").
'Rawls v. Durham Realty & Ins. Co., 189 N. C. 368, 127 S. E. 254 (1925).
" McLean v. McLean, 101 N. E. 178, 180 (N. Y. 1913).
"In re Kirk's Estate, 191 Misc. Rep. 473, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 378 (1948) ; In re
Kraston's Will, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 364 (1945); In re Kreutz' Will, 49 N. Y. S. 2d
402 (1944) ; In re Hagendorn's Will, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 491 (1943) ; I re Backer's
Estate, 148 Misc. Rep. 318, 266 N. Y. Supp. 47 (1933) ; In re Froeb's Estate, 143
Misc. Rep. 660, 257 N. Y. Supp. 851 (1931) ; In re Bryant's Estate, 121 Misc. Rep.
102, 201 N. Y. Supp. 60 (1923).
" Int re Von Finckenstein's Will, 179 Misc. Rep. 375, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 108
(1943) ; In re Curry's Will, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 544 (1940) ; accord, In re Bostwick's
Will, 78 Misc. Rep. 695, 140 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1912).2 n re Hartman's Estate, 55 N. Y. S. 2d 791 (1945).
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an after-born child was from inadvertence or mistake.14 Also it has
been said that such provision as contemplated by the statute may be
made for the child by the parent either by will, gift, or by settlement,
before, contemporaneous with, or after the will is made.15 Further, the
use of the term "any provision" in the statute would seem to furnish
the basis for a holding by the court that the benefits of an insurance
policy are a sufficient provision within the meaning of the statute.16
Nevertheless, the court has continued to adhere to a strict construction
of the statute, thereby defeating its purport and intent. Alhough it has
been stated that the a'dequacy of the provision is not to be determined
by the court but by the testator,17 it appears that the North Carolina
Supreme Court has in effect determined that insurance is not an ade-
quate provision under the pretermission statute.
As the court in the principal case expressed its obligation to stare
decisis, it would seem that a statutory amendment is necessary to
alleviate the harsh result and the strict interpretation that has devel-
oped in construing the after-born statute. Such action is desirable if
the original purpose and intent of the statute are to be effectuated. The
following statutory amendment is proposed:
Children born or adopted after the making of the parent's will,
and whose parent shall die without making any provision for
them whatsoever in such will or otherwise or without indicating
in such will an intent to exclude them therefrom, shall be en-
titled to such share and proportion of the parent's estate as if he
or she had died intestate, and the rights of any such after-born
child shall be a lien on every part of the parent's estate, until
his several share thereof is set apart in the manner prescribed
in §28-153 to 28-158.18
DAVID L. STRAIN, Jit.
1
,Flanner v. Flanner, 160 N. C. 126, 75 S. E. 936 (1912) ; Thompson v. Julian,
133 N. C. 309, 45 S. E. 636 (1903); Meares v. Meares, 26 N. C. 192 (1843).
'
5Flanner v. Flanner, 160 N. C. 126, 75 S. E. 936 (1912).
26 See Meares v. Meares, 26 N. C. 192, 197 (1843) (". . . the statute only
provides for the case where the parent dies without having made provision for
the child, which means, without making any provision .. ." [italics supplied]).
17 King v. Davis, 91 N. C. 142 (1884) ; Meares v. Meares, 26 N. C. 192 (1843).
11 Proposed changes to N. C. GEir. STAT. §31-45 (1943) are indicated by italics.
See Second Report of the Commission on the Revision of the Laws of North
Carolina Relating to Estates (1939), p. 87.
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